Erdogan's presidency a risk to Turkey

Recep Tayyip Erdogan's presidency could seriously
weaken Turkey ' s AKP and hurt its chances in future
elections .
The local elections in Turkey a few months ago
produced only one victor - Prime Minister Recep
Erdogan - and everyone else was a loser , including
his own Justice and Development Party ( AKP).
In the weeks leading up those elections , Erdogan
increasingly personalised the political discourse and
turned the mayoral elections into a plebiscite for his
one - man rule. He interpreted the landslide victory as
a green light for his presidential ambitions, which he
announced on July 1 .
Most polls project an Erdogan victory . If these
projections come true, Erdogan will soon become
Turkey 's twelfth (and the first popularly elected
" civilian") president since 1923 . This may sound
like good news to the prime minister and his
supporters , but it is not necessarily so.
Erdogan, the leader and the 'victim'
In the ten months before the March 2014 elections ,
Turkish politics experienced two major crises. The
first one was the Gezi demonstrations of May- Jun
2013 . The second one was the December 17
corruption scandal that implicated key government
officials and their family members.
Erdogan is a strong populist leader. His main
strength has been his extreme ability to set the
agenda for domestic and regional politics and every
day discourse . He would proactively set the agenda;
the opposition, media and the rest of the society
would sheepishly follow .
But beginning with the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil
war, the coup d' etat in Egypt , and especially the Gezi
events Erdogan found himself in an unfamiliar
terrain . He was no longer in the driver's seat . Others
were setting the agenda , and Erdogan was only
passively - and often belatedly - reacting to what
was happening in the streets of Istanbul, Damascus
and Cairo . Likewise, in the case of the Dececember
17 scandal, it was police chiefs and prosecutors who
were setting the agenda and making the headlines,
not the prime minister .
That he was no longer the agenda - setting leader
frustrated and angered Erdogan , blurred his
judgment and made him increasingly insular and
paranoid . In this vein, he has adopted an increasingly
controversial and polarising style of politics .
His speeches and policies alienated various groups
in Turkish society . He viewed every event and
development as an assault on his personality and
family. The " enemy" changed almost every day . One
day it was the Constitutional Court which Erdogan
accused of being " unpatriotic" after the court
removed the twitter ban ; another day it was the
governor of the Central Bank whom Erdogan accused
of undermining his government' s policies and
serving the " interest rate lobby" . One thing remained
constant though : Erdogan was always the " victim" .
The victimisation narrative and the personification of
political discourse in recent years has emphasised
Erdogan' s personal traits and charisma over the
authority of the AKP , and increasingly contributed to
its deinstitutionalisation. The party was simply
reduced to an "Erdogan lovers club" . Glorification,
prophetisation and deitisation of Erdogan
have become almost a common practice among
local party leaders and members of parliament .
For instance , according to a party deputy from
Duzce, Erdogan was a leader who embodied all
qualities of God. Similarly, a local party boss from
Aydin , in 2010 , declared Erdogan the "second "
prophet of Islam . Many other members of the party
also went on record declaring that they were ready
to die and become martyrs in defence of their leader ,
Erdogan.
A party for the leader
Against the background of the ongoing personality
cult , the future of AKP after Erdogan is highly
dubious. Many supporters cannot even imagine the
party without its leader: AKP is Erdogan, and Erdogan
is AKP . In this regard, his decision to run in
presidential elections in August is highly risky. In
fact, he might come to regret it one day because it
is very likely that by moving to Cankaya Palace , he
will lose the immense powers and influence he
amassed as prime minister since 2003 .
There are several reasons for this . First, Erdogan
has so far failed to rewrite the constitution and
change the parliamentary system into a presidential
one because he did not command the necessary
majority in the parliament .
Second , Erdogan also failed to change the current
electoral system of proportional representation into a
majoritarian (first- pass- the -post ) system that would
give his party a supermajority in the 2015
parliamentary elections. According to the
constitution, the deadline to adopt a new electoral
system to be used in 2015 was June 2014. Thus , it
looks like if Erdogan becomes the next president , he
will need to settle for the relatively limited powers
and authority currently conferred upon the
presidency under the constitution.
In the Turkish system the prime minister is the head
of the government , not the president . Realising that
he may never be able to rewrite the constitution so
he could be head of both government and the state ,
Erdogan has told his supporters that he won' t settle
for a "ceremonial " office , but an " active" one which
allow him to build bridges and roads.
Under the current constitution, the president has no
such roles and duties. This means that in order for
" President Erdogan" to continue shaping everyday
government policy, he needs to install a weak puppet
prime minister who he can use to maintain his
stranglehold over party and state affairs.
In this context , it is important to note that AKP' s
internal charter bans members from running for
office after serving three consecutive terms in
parliament . The current legislative term ( 2011- 2015)
is the third term of the AKP. This means that by 2015
many influential AKP members who founded the
party with Erdogan and served in cabinet positions
will lose their offices .
This will give Erdogan a chance to purge supporters
of President Abdullah Gul who established AKP with
Erdogan from the rank and file , and fill the party with
inexperienced loyalists who will serve him well in the
next 5- 10 years and ensure that the next cabinet will
be loyal to him .
Although this is a very likely to happen , it is also
very risky for both Erdogan and the party . If Erdogan
follows this strategy , he will be in indirect control of
the party . He will need to rely upon proxies for
management of everyday party business .
In politics there are always principal- agent
problems . Agents may shirk responsibility and , more
importantly over time, their preferences and
interests may diverge from those of the
principal ; thus, there is no guarantee that this model
will produce the most effective and reliable results
for Erdogan.
Then comes the question of who will be responsible
for policy failures . Of course , since the president
cannot be held accountable under the current
constitution, for every policy failure , Erdogan will
blame the government. In the end , this will weaken
AKP and seriously harm its chances in future
elections .
If this happens , it is also very possible that
disgruntled Gul supporters and those who were left
out of office because of the three -term rule may
leave AKP and set up their own party under the
leadership of President Gul , who has been at odds
with Erdogan for some time now. In the worst case ,
the weakened AKP may lose the elections and an
incoming government may decide to open a
corruption investigation against Erdogan and try to
force him to resign.
Erdogan does have an alternative . He can appoint an
interim prime minister until 2015 elections , and
thereafter have Abdullah Gul take over as head of
government and chairman of the party. However , in
this case Erdogan will not be able to maintain his
control over the state and party affairs .
Gul , who has not been happy about the direction the
country has taken under Erdogan in the last few
years, would not allow him to expand his powers but
would let him stay in the Cankaya Palace
" untouched" . In this case, the AKP may preserve its
political power for another term or two , while
Erdogan - albeit relatively marginalised - would get
to serve as president with limited powers but
complete immunity to possible corruption charges.
In either case, the presidency is a high -stake
gamble for both the prime minister and the AKP.
Yuksel Sezgin is Assistant Professor of Political
Science, Maxwell School of Public Affairs , Syracuse
University.